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Introduction
Economic data usually influence policy through
a reduced-form analysis. Using such an analy-
sis, the researcher generally poses an empirical
relationship between an outcome variable, such
as a firm’s total investment, and a policy vari-
able, such as the design of a particular tax. This
relationship serves as a point of departure in
the analysis. Explicit assumptions about behav-
ior that underlie the relationship are not em-
phasized; rather, the researcher asserts that 
the “data do the talking.” Policy implications,
where they exist, are directly observed in the
pattern estimated in the data. Most empirical
analyses of policy questions follow a reduced-
form strategy.1
It is easy to understand why a reduced-form
approach might, at first glance, appear to be the
best way to analyze policy. It is a simple meth-
odology, and thus can more easily keep track of
what is happening during the complicated proc-
ess of analyzing data. One does not need to
specify a sophisticated and consistent model of
behavior to use this approach. Further, the an-
swers embodied in the model estimates may
accord with a wide variety of behaviors that
could be true of the firm. 
A different approach to estimating the effect
of taxes would be to specify a model of optimiz-
ing behavior on the part of the firm and to
model the tax policy as a set of constraints on
this optimizing behavior. A simplistic reason for
preferring the reduced-form approach is that
economists are interested only in the overall
effect of a proposed tax policy on investment.
Why should we care about the intermediate
steps by which a tax will affect the firm?
How successful is the reduced-form ap-
proach at testing a behavior or measuring a
policy effect? Given that we are never shown
the truth behind the mystery, this paper will
examine the history of an economic question
that has been subjected to 35 years of intense
scrutiny: Does corporate financial structure af-
fect real investment? The empirical answer to
this question, which lies at the heart of corpo-
rate financial economics, has heavily influ-
enced every tax reform bill since the 1960s.
n    1 Reduced form has a different meaning here than in simultaneous
equations estimation, where a reduced form is estimated by regressing an
endogenous variable on all of the exogenous variables in a system of
equations.  We use the term in a wider context, where the pattern in the
data—not an assumed behavioral structure—forms the point of depar-
ture for estimation.
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The initial econometric strategy was to follow a
pure reduced-form approach. How well have
the results of this research program held up to
further scrutiny? 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) provide the
first theoretical model showing the influence 
of corporate debt structure on investment. In
the world they portray, perfect capital markets,
coupled with symmetric information about the
investment prospects of the firm, the investors,
and the lenders, mean that the firm’s debt level
is irrelevant to the amount of investment it
undertakes. 
One reduced-form approach would be to
directly examine the empirical relevance of the
Modigliani–Miller (hereafter “MM”) hypothesis
that with perfect capital markets, no taxes, and
a given investment policy, capital structure is
irrelevant to firm value. As a consequence, nei-
ther capital structure nor dividends should
affect investment behavior. The MM proposi-
tions provide the following broad empirical
prediction: In a properly specified regression of
investment on the debt/equity ratio, dividends,
and other covariates, the coefficients of debt/
equity and dividends should equal zero. A
reduced-form estimating strategy uses this pre-
diction as the point of departure.
The following two sections discuss the his-
tory of tests of this hypothesis from both a
cross-section and a time-series perspective.
Next, we step back and explore the reasons for
the pattern in the early reduced-form estimates
through a simple structural model. We then
look at what we have learned about whether a
tax policy can affect investment through its
influence on a company’s financial structure.
We conclude with the object lessons that ac-
company 35 years of intensive research on this
topic—lessons that could be applied to other
situations where the reduced form is used to
help shape policy. What did we first believe the
data were telling us, and how did these beliefs
change under close scrutiny? After all this time
spent researching a single hypothesis, what lim-





The clear and simple MM hypothesis that there
is no relationship between financing and real
capital investment seems to lend itself easily to
cross-section regressions. The early reduced-
form models assume away the importance of
differential corporate and personal income
taxes, which are a clear violation of the original
MM statement. Thus, they jointly test the MM
model and the hypothesis that the income tax
structure is irrelevant to the effect of financial
structure on real investment. We will treat the
two tests separately later in this paper. The test
of the joint hypothesis measures the statistical
significance of financial variables in an invest-
ment equation where the dependent variable is
capital investment and the independent vari-
ables are measures of a firm’s financial position,
which may include its debt/equity ratio, cash
flow, and dividends. The hypothesis of no rela-
tionship between financing and investment is
rejected if the coefficients of the debt/equity
ratio and dividends are statistically close to
zero. A simple regression is not adequate here
because both dividend payments and the firm’s
debt are endogenous. Thus, absence of a corre-
lation between the debt/equity ratio and invest-
ment is not necessarily evidence that the MM
hypothesis holds. 
To alleviate this problem, early cross-section
studies specified instruments in a system that
estimated investment (I), dividends (D), and
new debt (ND) equations of the general form 
Iit =  a0 + a1Dit + a2NDit + a3Xit + eI
Dit =  b0 + b1Iit + b2NDit + b3Y it + eD
NDit =  g0 + g1Iit + g2Dit + g3Zit + eND ,
wherei and t are firm and time subscripts, the
e’s are statistical error terms, and X, Y, and Z are
vectors of exogenous explanatory variables. For
the investment equation to be identified (so that
we are estimating a separate equation for invest-
ment, not a hodgepodge of all three equations),
the vectors Y and Z must contain variables that
are not included in X. It is this process of identi-
fication that proved so problematic in the early
reduced-form studies. What exogenous variable
affects dividends and debt levels but does not
influence investment behavior?
It is important to note here that the MM
hypothesis is not a theory of investment, but of
why a firm’s financial structure does not influ-
ence investment. The estimating system of
equations that test the MM hypothesis must in-
clude a theory of investment (even if it is im-
plicit) to control for its endogeneity. Thus, the
reduced form is a joint test of both the MM
hypothesis and an underlying theory of invest-
ment. For example, if the researcher holds in-
vestment opportunities constant through using 
a measure of Tobin’s q, then the test of the MM
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hypothesis also tests whether Tobin’s q is an
empirically useful model of investment behav-
ior.2 Hence, the test is only as good as the
theory of investment.
The early studies used identifying instru-
ments 3 that included profits, proxies for firm
size and taxes, and firm and industry dummy
variables to allow for fixed firm and industry
effects.4 (See, for example, Dhrymes and Kurz
[1967], McDonald, Jacquillat, and Nussenbaum
[1975], and McCabe [1979].) These studies, like
so many modern consulting reports, argue by
assertion—for example, the profit level should
affect dividends but not investment. Unfortu-
nately, a researcher’s assertion that a variable is
an instrument does not necessarily make it so. 
A reduced form offers few checks as to whether
the assertion reflects reality.
Empirical tests of the MM irrelevance hypoth-
esis during the 1970s and early 1980s, though
more advanced econometrically, still came up
short in modeling differences in the financial
environment firms face. Although the studies
varied in their conclusions, all suffered from the
lack of a convincing instrument that would
control for a firm’s investment opportunities.
Again, the studies could not adequately address
the fact that firms with better investment oppor-
tunities might choose higher levels of debt.
McDonald, Jacquillat, and Nussenbaum esti-
mate cross-section models using ordinary least
squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares
(2SLS), as does McCabe, but their conclusions
differ. McDonald et al. find support for the MM
propositions, while McCabe does not. Because
investment opportunities surely vary across
firms and certainly affect investment indepen-
dently of financial structure, these early studies
were never conclusive tests of the MM irrele-
vance hypothesis.
Another reason for conflicting conclusions
among the early empirical studies seems to lie
in the differences in equation specification.
McDonald et al., like many other researchers
before McCabe, estimate investment as a func-
tion of contemporaneous variables only.
Because it is likely that the decision to invest
today will depend in part on financial decisions
made previously, excluding lagged financing
and dividend variables from an investment
equation results in a misspecification. 
How was one to choose between these early
studies? If they had been structural, a researcher
could affirm that a particular study was the most
convincing if it had more believable parameter
estimates (for example, if it generated rate-of-
return estimates of the same general magnitude
as the interest rate). A classic indication that a
system is identified improperly (that is, by false
assumptions) is that estimates of the individual
equations yield parameters that make little sense
economically. One reason the earliest tests of
the MM hypothesis seemed, on balance, to sup-
port the theory was that the estimates which
rejected MM had the “wrong” expected sign for
the dividend equation. This seemed to indicate
that the studies which did not reject the hypoth-
esis used more convincing instruments. One pit-
fall of a simple reduced-form strategy is that it
yields so few checks of whether an estimated
parameter makes economic sense.
Subsequent cross-section studies made sig-
nificant improvements over previous work. For
example, Peterson and Benesh (1983) estimate
a system of three equations similar to that used
in earlier studies (adding a lagged profit vari-
able to the investment equation and a lagged
dividend variable to the dividend equation),
but in addition to estimating the standard OLS,
2SLS, and 3SLS models, they also conduct MM
hypothesis tests on the reduced-form equations
by estimating a seemingly unrelated regressions
(SUR) model. Their SUR results corroborate the
2SLS and 3SLS findings, which reject the null
hypothesis that financing and investment deci-
sions are independent. The lagged profit vari-
able serves as a proxy (albeit an imperfect one)
for investment opportunities, which makes the
rejection of the MM irrelevance hypothesis
somewhat more convincing.
The use of lagged profits suffers from a prob-
lem common to all studies that rely on lagged
variables for identifying instruments. Although it
is true that lagged profits are approximate meas-
ures of investment opportunities, they may also
affect both dividends and debt in the same
ways that these variables were correlated with
the original contemporaneous error term. It is
not clear that simply including the lagged profit
term will correct the original statistical bias.
Most recent reduced-form cross-section mod-
els reject the MM hypothesis. (See, for example,
Gilchrist and Himmelberg [1995].) However,
n   2 Tobin’s q is defined as the ratio of the market value of capital to
the replacement cost of capital.
n   3 An instrument is a variable that is correlated with a variable on the
right-hand side of the equation (in this case, corporate debt or dividends)
without being correlated with the statistical error term. An identifying
instrument in this case is one that is correlated with the right-hand vari-
ables without being included as a right-hand variable. Thus, it may be
included in the equation where dividends or debt are left-side variables,
but it must be excluded from the original investment equation.
n   4 In some cases, X, Y, and Z contain the same variables.
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these models often suffer a distressing lack of
robustness to econometric specification. This
makes precise determination of the estimated
reduced-form parameters problematic. Further,
the reduced-form approach does not present us
with an easy point of departure for determining
the correct econometric specification through
convincing tests. We also lack a consensus on
parameter estimates that are specific and precise
enough to be more useful in a policy context
than are cross-section reduced-form models.
Can we glean additional evidence on the empir-
ical validity of the MM irrelevance hypothesis
from time-series patterns in the data?
II. Granger 
Causality Tests
Given the difficulty of pinning down a con-
vincing set of instruments to tease out that part
of the correlation of debt and investment stem-
ming from debt’s possible impact on invest-
ment, some researchers have tried to deter-
mine the causality by studying the timing of
debt and investment. Thus, if investment pre-
cedes debt, the correlation may be spurious
because the firm, seizing its more potent
investment opportunities, creates more debt,
whereas the less fortunate firms do not have as
much debt. This would be the case when the
higher debt level was due to more investment
opportunities for the high-debt firm. The test of
a causal relationship between the variables pro-
posed by Granger (1969) says that if a variable
or event X (a change in a financial variable)
causes another variable or event Y (a change
in investment), then X should precede Y. The
test involves measuring the power of lagged
values of X in predicting Y. A test of whether
debt affects investment is connected to whether
corporate debt “Granger causes” investment.
Smirlock and Marshall (1983) perform
Granger causality tests on a sample of 194 firms
from 1958 to 1977. Using annual data on divi-
dends and investment, they fail to reject the null
hypothesis of no Granger causality for the ag-
gregate sample of firms. Causality tests on each
of the 194 firms’ series do not reject the null any
more often than would be expected by chance,
leading the authors to conclude that their results
support the MM irrelevance hypothesis.
True to the pattern of cross-section tests of
the MM hypothesis, the early test did not hold
up to later scrutiny. It is imperative that enough
variables be included in a Granger causality
study so that nearly identical firms are being
compared. For example, Smirlock and Marshall
omit a financing variable, so that the analysis
compares noncomparable firms that differ in
precisely that dimension which the causality test
requires to be the same. Mougoue and Mukher-
jee (1994) address this issue by including a
long-term debt-financing variable in their
causality tests. They find that dividend and
investment growth rates Granger cause each
other negatively, long-term debt and investment
growth rates Granger cause each other posi-
tively, and debt and dividends Granger cause
each other positively, thus rejecting the MM
irrelevance principle.5 If the reduced-form test is
to be appropriate, some sort of implicit structure
must underlie it. In this case, the researchers
had to have an idea about which financing vari-
ables were important so that the Granger
causality could test comparable firms.
Although Mougoue and Mukherjee’s Granger
causality tests can detect significant interactions
among investment, debt, and dividend vari-
ables, they do not tell us much else. That divi-
dends and investment Granger cause each other
simply means that a motion in one precedes a
motion in the other. Which comes first, the
investment chicken or the dividend egg? 
Moreover, it is somewhat ironic that
Mougoue and Mukherjee’s causality tests may
also suffer from a misspecification bias due to
the omission of a proxy for investment opportu-
nities, such as cash flow. If internal funds are
omitted from the system of equations, the ob-
served negative causality from dividends to
investment may actually stem from a negative
causality from dividends to retained earnings
and a negative causality from retained earnings
to investment. The MM irrelevance hypothesis
would still be rejected, but for different reasons.
Although more properly specified equation sys-
tems may be useful in illustrating the existence
of causal relationships, it appears that Granger
causality tests have only limited utility in distin-
guishing among the different hypotheses of
how, why, and to what degree financing and
real investment decisions interact.
In addition, Granger causality tests suffer
from a difficulty related to the forming of
expectations. If debt Granger causes invest-
ment, the interpretation is that the corporate
structure effects a change in investment behav-
ior. However, expectations about investment
n   5 It is assumed here that firms use borrowed funds to finance future
investment or to increase dividend payments.   Because the variables are
expressed as changes in logarithms (growth rates), positive bidirectional
causality between debt and investment does not support or refute the pres-
ence of financing constraints, as it might if debt and investment were
expressed in levels.
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opportunities could just as well influence both
investment and corporate debt levels, but affect
debt sooner because debt levels adjust more
quickly. Tests that center on the timing of debt
and investment thus provide weak evidence on
the relevance of the MM hypothesis.
Interestingly, the pattern of evidence in the
Granger causality tests is the same as the pat-
tern in the cross-section regression results. Ini-
tially, the evidence seemed to support the MM
hypothesis. However, closer scrutiny and
clearer identifying assumptions tend to reject
the hypothesis. Even current studies are unable
to provide more information than a crude rejec-
tion of the hypothesis. Precise parameter esti-
mates needed for policy prediction seem to
require a different estimation strategy. Why do
we observe this pattern in the reduced-form
estimates? It is not clear which part of the joint
hypothesis—perfect capital markets or the
empirical irrelevance of the personal and cor-
porate income tax structure—is being rejected
by the above tests. To further define the two
hypotheses, a simple heuristic model is needed. 
III. A MM 
Structural Model
In this section, we explore a model in which
the underlying behavior of firms generates the
data. A simple statement of the model will clar-
ify the measurement problems inherent in test-
ing the MM hypothesis with cross-section or
time-series data. A MM firm chooses the levels
of investment, I0, in a project that will pay F(I0)
dollars for each period in the future, F ¢(I0) > 0,
F²(I0) < 0, so that the firm receives 
(1)   S
t = 1
¥ F(I0)
(1 + r)t    =
r
F(I0)
from the investment, where r represents the
interest rate.6 The firm starts with a predeter-
mined amount of cash, C, and must decide
how much of this cash to pay out in dividends,
Cd, and how much to reinvest, CI (C = Cd + CI).
The firm can also issue debt, D, to finance the
investment. A tax rate is imposed on a corpora-
tion at rate tc and on individuals at rate tp.
MM’s first observation is that the market
value of the shares, S, is just a tax-adjusted
value of the investment payoffs (including the
corporate cash paid out today, Cd) minus the
value of debt, or 
(2)     S = (1 – tp)Cd + (1 – tc) 
The firm maximizes S with respect to the
amount of investment subject to the financing
constraints I0 = CI + D and C = Cd + CI. A sim-
ple substitution gives
(3)   S = (1 – tp)( C–C I) + (1 – tc) 
with first-order conditions
(4)  F¢ = r
and 





corresponding to investment financed out of
debt and cash, respectively.
If the personal tax rate is equal to the corpo-
rate tax rate (or tp = tc, which nests the special
case of MM’s no-tax scenario), the first-order
conditions make it apparent that the expense of
an additional dollar of investment is the same
however it is financed, and that the firm fi-
nances from either debt or retained earnings un-
til the marginal benefit from investment is equal
to the outside rate of return (or F ¢[I0] = r).
It is important to note that the first-order
condition in this case simultaneously says two
things about the firm’s behavior. First, a firm’s
decision to finance a given level of investment
out of debt or retained earnings is irrelevant:
The firm is indifferent between the two. Sec-
ond, the investment level is determined by the
rule that the firm invests until the marginal ben-
efit of investment is equal to the interest rate.7
The level of debt says nothing about the value
of the firm except that it has traded debt for
dividends at a rate of one for one. Investors
who are paying for a share of the company and
who might prefer a higher level of debt in their
portfolio can continue holding shares of this
firm, but elect to borrow more on the outside
market to increase the debt level within their
own portfolios. This and other similar possible
arbitrages force the share value to treat debt
and retained earnings symmetrically. 
In a world where the corporate tax rate is
higher than the personal tax rate, tc > tp, the
firm’s rule is to finance until the return on
n   6 The MM results do not depend on risk neutrality, a constant
stream of benefits, or a constant discount rate.  These are assumed here 
for expositional convenience.
n   7 In the MM exposition, the firm invests until the marginal benefit
equals the rate of return for the firm’s risk class.  The theory also shows
that investment financed out of new equity issues is equivalent to invest-








Economic Review 1996 Q 1investment is equal to r. The investment is fi-
nanced entirely out of debt and all of the cash
appears as a dividend. Financing out of debt
rather than retained earnings costs less
because debt payments are fully deductible.
MM (1963) makes the point that the tax ad-
vantages of debt financing (interest payments
are deductible as a cost in calculating corpo-
rate taxes) imply that investment should never
be financed out of retained earnings in a pure
example of their model. Indeed, because of
the tax advantages, the firm prefers to borrow
more than its investment amount to finance a
larger dividend. Clearly, a more complicated
model is needed to explain why a corporation
chooses one method of financing over another.
However, the simpler model may still be ade-
quate to explain the level of investment if the
data show no relationship between that level
and corporate financial structure.
If the corporate tax rate is less than the per-
sonal tax rate, then cash is the relatively less
expensive investment source. The firm will use
only cash to finance investment unless the
marginal return on investment after all of the
cash is used (and the dividend is zero) exceeds
the cost of financing additional investment out
of debt (or F¢[C] > r). At this point, debt be-
comes the marginal investment source, with
the first-order condition given by equation (4).
If F¢(C) < r, then debt will equal zero, and
only cash will be used to finance investment,
until equation (5) is satisfied.
The top federal individual tax rate and the
top federal corporate tax rate are currently
about the same (39.6 percent versus 38 per-
cent). However, in many states, the top corpo-
rate rate is higher than the top individual rate
(in Ohio, the respective figures are 8.1 percent
and 4.1 percent). Based on the above analysis,
one would expect to find corporations financing
investment entirely out of debt and never using
retained earnings for this purpose. Clearly, this
is not the case, as firms use both debt and
equity financing. One reason companies do not
rely solely on debt is that outside credit con-
straints (or the costs of bankruptcy) may make
the marginal cost of debt rise as the total level
of debt increases. In other words, the market
value of debt may decrease the firm’s value
faster at higher debt levels because high debt
may alert the capital markets that the firm is less
likely to survive, or because lenders become
less willing to lend to firms that could be hit
with bankruptcy costs. In this world, the value
of the shares might be written as
(6)   S = (1 – tp)( C–C I) 
+ (1 – tc) [
F (I 0)
r –[ D+d( D)]].
The parameter d is the increasing cost of
debt not captured in the interest rate, where
d(0) = 0, d¢ > 0, and d¢¢ > 0. The new rule for
debt-financed investment is 
(7)  F ¢(I0) = r [1 + d¢(D)]. 
The first-order condition for investment fi-
nanced out of equity is the same as in equation
(5). The rule for investment explicitly makes
the amount of investment a decreasing function
of the firm’s debt level if the firm finances out
of debt. Similar to the MM model, the first-order
conditions can generate corner solutions in
which the firm finances investment either com-
pletely out of debt or completely out of cash.
For example, if tc  < tp, the firm will finance up
to its total cash holdings out of equity, then
finance out of debt only if the marginal return
on investment at that point is greater than or
equal to r. If the corporate tax rate is greater
than the personal tax rate (as it is for most U.S.
corporations), then the investment rule is more
complicated. The firm will finance out of debt
only if [1 + d¢(D)] < (1 – tp)/(1 – tc); that is, if
the marginal cost of increasing the firm’s debt
burden is small enough. If this is not the case,
firms will use both debt and cash to finance
their investment projects. First-order conditions
for investment financed out of cash remain the
same (equation [5]), so that the equation deter-
mining the debt level, if both debt and cash are
used to finance investment, is





It is important for policymakers to know
whether a world represented by MM or an
environment of substantially increasing mar-
ginal cost of debt, crudely represented by equa-
tion (6), best reflects investment behavior. One
easy reduced-form test of the MM assumptions
in the earlier cross-section studies was to exam-
ine whether investment was negatively corre-
lated with debt. If the study detected no nega-
tive relationship, then the conclusion might be
that equation (6) did not make empirical sense.
However, as the following example illustrates,
lack of correlation between debt and equity
might occur in a world that is very non-MM.
Suppose our sample consists of two types of
firms that differ only in their set of investment
opportunities. Each type faces an investment
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payoff of aiF(I), where a1 > a2. The empirical
researcher observes only the debt and invest-
ment outcomes of the two firms. The firms face
a very non-MM world, one in which increasing
debt discourages investment, represented by
equation (6). We further assume that both debt
and equity are used to finance investment, so
that equation (8) holds. First-order conditions
for the two firms are F ¢(I0) =  r
ai  
[1 + d¢(D)] = 
r(1 – tp)/ai (1 – tc). The behavior rule gives the
following outcome: I1 > I2 and, if both firms fi-
nance investment out of some of their retained
earnings, D1 = D2.8 A simple regression of in-
vestment on the firm’s debt level would lend
support to the MM hypothesis of the irrelevance
of debt for the level of investment, even though
the data are generated by a behavior where the
debt level, ceteris paribus, discourages invest-
ment. Clearly, lack of a simple correlation be-
tween debt and investment is not enough to test
the appropriateness of the theory. If the poten-
tial cash available to the individual firms, C, is
unobserved by the empirical researcher (as is
likely), then the dividend amount may also be
uncorrelated with the investment level. The
problem is that the corporate financial instru-
ments are behavior variables chosen by the
agents, not experimental variables applied by
the researcher.
Any estimation must take into account that
both investment and corporate financial struc-
ture are caused by the environment facing the
firm, and that the available data contain very lit-
tle of the information needed to reconstruct the
decision process for each firm’s investment and
corporate financial structure, even if all of the
correct variables are included. The key to the
earlier studies lay in finding sufficient instru-
ments to control for the different investment
opportunities represented by ai and for the fact
that debt was a behavioral variable chosen by
the firm. Poor instrument choice was bound to
lead to poor estimates. In this estimating con-
text, the underlying structure of behavior and a
clear notion of what is generating differences
across observations are needed to formulate a
useful reduced form.
The problems with reduced-form analysis are
clear from this example, yet researchers do not
necessarily have the data to conduct a full-
blown structural estimation. Despite these limi-
tations, we can profit from structural models by
using them to devise a test that can help un-
cover some of the important factors driving
firms’ investment decisions.




Early reduced-form empirical work on the tax
effects of the investment/financing relationship,
such as Long and Malitz (1985), Titman and
Wessels (1988), and Fischer, Heinkel, and
Zechner (1989), failed to find economically or
statistically significant effects, just as early
reduced-form studies failed to find a link be-
tween corporate financial structure and invest-
ment. These early nonstructural studies had an
important influence on the policy debate, par-
ticularly when federal tax reform was discussed.
For example, when the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) was being debated, it
was theoretically understood that in a credit-
constrained world, the investment tax credit
might yield a strong substitution effect as firms
changed their investment funding from debt fi-
nancing to retained earnings. This was not con-
sidered important because the early reduced-
form estimates indicated that the effect of taxes
on corporate financial structure was negligible.9
Subsequent, more careful work has generally
found evidence of a significant tax effect. For
example, MacKie-Mason (1990) states that earlier
studies suffered from a failure to fully consider
the impact of a firm’s tax shields (tax deductions
or investment tax credits) on its effective mar-
ginal tax rate. He notes that if a firm has no
taxable income, any additional tax shields it
receives will have no impact on its marginal tax
rate. The marginal rate will be affected only if
tax shields lower taxable income to zero. By tak-
ing this point into account and investigating
incremental financing decisions using discrete-
choice models instead of debt/equity ratios,
MacKie-Mason finds evidence that firms with
high tax-loss carryforwards are less likely to rely
on debt. This is certainly consistent with both
the theoretical models of MM and the debt-
constraint model, which predict that as the cor-
porate tax rate decreases, debt should shrink.
This more recent finding of a significant tax
effect forces the reduced-form research to be
more careful in defining its hypotheses. How
do taxes influence investment? They could
n   8 This follows directly from the relation = 1 + d¢(D).
n   9 See Trezevant (1994), which discusses the contemporary debate
surrounding ERTA. The author finds a significant substitution effect in taxes.
( 1 – tc)
( 1 – tp)
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affect it directly through a change in the post-
tax price of real investment, or indirectly
through a change in corporate financial struc-
ture, as demonstrated in the previous section.
The indirect influence is the one of interest to
corporate finance. Separation of the indirect
financial effect from the direct real-price effect
requires a clarity that makes reduced-form esti-
mation look more like structural estimation.
This clarity is seen in more recent research
that concentrates on the impact of taxes on
corporate financial structure. Givoly et al.
(1992) and Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard
(1994) find evidence of a relationship between
debt and taxes. The Givoly study empirically
examines the response of business firms to the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA). The authors
find evidence of a substitution effect between
debt and nondebt tax shields, as hypothesized
by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). In addition,
both corporate and personal tax rates appear
to affect leverage decisions. 
Givoly et al. provide a good example of how
forming an implicit structure about the effect of
taxes provides a precise hypothesis for testing
with a reduced-form estimation strategy. Con-
sider how they use their structure and their
knowledge of TRA specifics to develop simple
statistical hypotheses. For example, they use
only 1987 data to describe TRA’s effect, because
they assert that the Act was surrounded by
uncertainty until its actual passage by the Sen-
ate. Their test year was 1987, and their control
years were 1984 and 1985, before any tax re-
form legislation was introduced. Although firms
might have behaved in anticipation of a new tax
structure, it is unlikely that this Lucas effect
would be of overriding importance in the statis-
tical results. 
Givoly et al. test their hypotheses involving
tax code changes by estimating standard cross-
section OLS regressions of the change in lever-
age on the firm’s effective tax rate, nondebt tax
shields, dividend yield, Tobin’s q, firm size,
business risk, and changes in depreciation and
investment tax credits.10  The authors are able to
reach definitive conclusions about the effect of
the TRA using cross-section analysis because
they state their hypotheses carefully. For exam-
ple, the TRA greatly reduced the statutory cor-
porate tax rates, so that firms faced more similar
rates. Thus, their Hypothesis 1 states that in re-
sponse to the decline in the statutory corporate
tax rate, firms with a high marginal effective rate
will decrease their leverage more than will firms
with a low marginal effective rate. In other
words, the decline in the effective corporate tax
rate will have a greater impact on firms with
high marginal tax burdens. Low effective tax
rates imply a low tax advantage of debt and re-
sult in a smaller decrease in leverage stemming
from a cut in the statutory tax rate. Hence, the
relationship between the effective tax rate and
changes in leverage should be inverse.
Notice how the hypothesis embodies a solid
underlying structure of how the firm reacts to a
tax change. This structure gives the hypothesis
a clarity and specificity that provide the neces-
sary power for a reduced-form test. The hy-
pothesis also illustrates a clear understanding of
the workings of the tax code. Although tax
laws specify the marginal statutory corporate
tax rate, corporate decisions are based on the
marginal effective tax rate, which is the present
value of future tax payments resulting from an
additional dollar of taxable income. The statu-
tory rate is the same for all firms, but the ef-
fective rate differs from firm to firm above a
certain dollar amount. Tax shields such as in-
vestment tax credits, tax-loss carryforwards,
depreciation allowances, and interest expenses
lower the effective tax rate.
The Givoly results support all of their hy-
potheses: Each of the relevant coefficients is sta-
tistically significant and has the proper sign for
1987, the first year the TRA was in effect. The
hypotheses appear to be of moderate economic
significance. For example, a firm with an effec-
tive tax rate 10 percent above that of another
firm would have lowered its debt/equity ratio
1.15 percent more in response to the TRA.
Givoly and others provide only part of the
answer regarding the effect of financial struc-
ture on real input decisions. By showing that
taxes influence financial structure, the studies
have shown that capital markets are imperfect,
thus providing an important clue as to why the
MM propositions are not supported by the data.
However, they have not clearly shown how
these financial decisions impact real input deci-
sions. Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect
is far from certain. Thus, the latest findings
point out one link of the chain of indirect tax
effects through capital structure by showing
how taxes influence corporate finance. How-
ever, the complete change still suffers from lack
of information on the magnitude of the effect
of corporate financial structure on real invest-
ment decisions.
n   10 In Givoly et al., Tobin’s q proxies for bankruptcy costs and the
collateral value of the firm when bankrupt.  Business risk is proxied by the
coefficient of variation in operating income (minus depreciation) over the
firm’s last 10 years.
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Although earlier empirical work found no
significant tax effects, more recent studies have
addressed the inherent empirical problems and
have produced evidence that supports the
importance of taxes on financing decisions.
Hence, one link between policy and real invest-
ment behavior has been established, but only
after very clear statements about the firm’s
underlying structural behavior were used to
define relevant variables and identifying as-
sumptions. These are formulations that require a
careful, informed analysis. Even so, only a fully
structural model can provide policymakers with
an accurate measure of how changes in tax pol-
icy influence real investment. Without parame-
ter estimates from such a model, the short- and
long-term effects of tax policy changes on real
investment remain uncertain.
V. Conclusion
What have we learned from examining 35 years
of research? In each case—the direct test of the
MM hypothesis through cross-section regres-
sions, the test of the timing of investment
through Granger causality, and the test of
whether taxes should matter to corporate finan-
cial structure—the findings exhibit the same
pattern. Early research often failed to reveal sta-
tistical significance in the relationship between
corporate real investment and the explanatory
variable, be it financial structure or taxes. This
seemed to provide prima facie support for the
empirical relevance of MM’s assertions.
Our present knowledge of corporate finan-
cial structure through reduced-form estimation
is typical of what a more careful reduced-form
strategy can do. The weight of the current evi-
dence seems to reject the MM neutrality hypoth-
esis. Financial structure does matter to a firm’s
investment decisions, and taxes do influence
these decisions through their effect on financial
structure. These are important statements to
bear in mind both when deciding on policy and
when formulating new theory with which to
guide policy. 
Our cautionary tale does not say that the re-
duced form is an unwise estimation strategy.
Rather, it notes what conditions are necessary if
a reduced form is to yield accurate results. In all
cases, an underlying structure of behavior (even
when not used explicitly in a structural estima-
tion model) guided the research through the
crucial steps of data definition and formulating
the correct econometric test. It is also important
to note that a reduced-form analysis is a critical
step in any empirical study of a policy question.
Simply estimating a structural model without
first determining and reporting general direc-
tions in the data is a recipe for disaster.
However, the reduced-form strategy, when
used without accompanying structural esti-
mates, is distinguished by what it has not
done. We do not have precise estimates of the
magnitude of the effects. Because the estimat-
ing equations are formulated without an
explicit structure, the resulting parameters are
subject to fewer “reality checks” to determine
whether they make economic sense. In addi-
tion, fewer comparisons can be made to
related empirical literatures to determine the
appropriateness of the estimating equations’
specifications. Is this or that estimated parame-
ter comparable to a risk-aversion parameter
estimated in the portfolio-balance literature?
We cannot tell from a reduced-form estimate
because the reduced form resists a structural
interpretation that will allow comparison. 
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